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ABSTRACT 
 
Enrolment in Micro Life and Health Insurance: 
Evidences from Sri Lanka
* 
 
Microinsurance is an emerging concept protecting households from the potentially 
catastrophic expenditures associated with family related shocks. Therefore, this paper 
presents evidence on the determinants of insurance participation using probit models on 
household survey data from Sri Lanka, conditional on household’s microfinance institution 
enrolment. Further, we employ multivariate probit regressions to analyse factors affecting the 
participation in different types of insurance. We find that the household’s experience of a 
family related shock is positively associated with the participation in micro health insurance 
schemes under study. There is strong evidence that microinsurance has not yet succeeded 
in proportionately reaching the most vulnerable households. Notably, education of the 
household head is a strong determinant of microinsurance participation. 
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1  Introduction 
Few recent ideas have generated as much hope for alleviating poverty of poor households 
in developing countries as the idea of microfinance. In recent years, microfinance has grown and 
become more and more diversified due to a higher demand-orientation. Taking the demand of 
low-income groups into consideration has led the microfinance industry to diversify its savings 
and recently its insurance products (Zeller and Sharma 2002, Armendáriz and Morduch 2005, 
Bendig et al. 2009). The evolution of microinsurance out of microfinance promises the prospect 
of reducing the vulnerability of poor people to negative shocks and their consequences on 
income and consumption.  
The type of risks faced by the poor such as that of death, illness, injury and accident, are 
no different from those faced by others, but they are indeed more exposed to such risks that can 
severely affect their livelihoods due to their economic status, income and earning abilities 
(Holzmann and Joergensen 2000, Siegel et al. 2001). A household can cope with risk at two 
stages, ex ante and ex post of the occurrence of such shock (Morduch 1995, Townsend 1995, 
Kazianga and Udry 2006). First, households can smooth income by diversifying economic 
activities and choosing conservative production or employment activities to prevent the 
households from the consequences of shocks before they occur. Second, households can smooth 
consumption by borrowing, saving, depleting and accumulating non-financial assets, changing 
labour supply, using formal and informal insurance arrangements to mitigate the consequences 
after the incidence of a shock. Therefore, the availability of sufficient and efficient risk 
management strategies are widely seen as an important integral to any poverty reduction strategy. 
In the past, insurance was not considered to be an option for low-income groups as an ex ante 
risk management strategy, as they were seen too poor to afford insurance premiums and as well 
as uninsurable to the wide variety of risks they face (Siegel et al. 2001).  
Microinsurance is defined as the ‘protection of low-income people against specific perils 
in exchange for regular premium payments proportionate to the likelihood and cost of the risk 
involved’ (Churchill 2006: 12). Using risk pooling in return for regular affordable premium 
payments proportionate to the likelihood and cost of the risk involved, microinsurance policies 
respond to the limited and variable cash flow of low-income households, and the often unstable 
economic environment in which they live. As their resources are so limited, poor people can 
experience great financial disruption when unexpected events befall them so that even small sums 
insured can provide some protection and function as a preventive risk management opportunity. 
Another motive for the provision of microinsurance is that insurance markets in the world and 
especially in developing countries are still incomplete and that low-income households have been   3
excluded from existing insurance schemes. On the one hand, there exists to some extent an 
unmet demand for insurance among the low-income groups, as they face many risks, do not have 
access to or not the abilities and empowerment to enter the formal insurance markets and on the 
other hand, formal insurers are not interested in that market segment which is outside the 
mainstream formal economy. As a result, they depend highly on traditional informal risk 
management mechanisms and public social security systems which are very costly and mostly 
insufficient to smooth consumption perfectly (Siegel et al. 2001).  
Various contributions exists so far on the demand for informal insurance in developing 
countries (Townsend 1995, Morduch 1995, Dercon 2002, Fafchamps and Lund 2003), whereas 
studies on the demand for formal insurance are rarely spread in the literature
2. None of the 
studies emphasizes different sequential steps of the household’s insurance participation decision. 
Therefore, we estimate conditional probit models that account for the first two steps of the 
insurance participation decision. First, we investigate what determines the enrolment of a 
household in a microfinance institution (MFI) and by doing so control for household’s access to 
the microfinance market. Second, we identify the determinants of household’s insurance 
participation conditional on household’s membership in a MFI. Finally, we employ multivariate 
probit regressions to estimate what determines household’s decision to uptake different types of 
insurance, i.e. life, health and any other type of insurance. This empirical evidence is based on a 
comprehensive household survey of 330 households from Sri Lanka. We examine household’s 
microinsurance participation, i.e. the usage of microinsurance, whereas the use of insurance, i.e. 
the actual provision, is determined by the demand and the supply of insurance (Worldbank, 2008: 
28)
3. Thereby, we emphasize primarily life and health insurance and focus on voluntary insurance 
offers
4. 
The outline of the paper is as follows: Section 2 discusses the conceptual framework and 
the theoretical and empirical determinants of microinsurance participation in the literature. 
Section 3 presents an overview of the microinsurance market and risk exposure in Sri Lanka, the 
research design and estimation methodology. The results of the estimations are discussed in 
Section 4. Section 5 concludes.  
                                                 
2 The paper is related to another thread of literature, i.e. the growing literature emphasizing the household’s ability to draw on 
their savings or entrance in informal risk sharing arrangements to smooth consumption. Various empirical studies show that 
households are able to protect consumption against certain income risks in developing countries, but not to achieve full insurance 
so far (See Townsend 1994, Kurosaki and Fafchamps 2002, Fafchamps and Lund 2003, for example). We cannot provide a full 
review of this extensive literature here. 
3 Whereas participation is determined by the demand and the supply of insurance (Worldbank, 2008: 28), we actually do not 
estimate the determinants of insurance demand, but the determinants of their actual provision, as non-insured households can be 
excluded voluntarily or involuntarily for a variety of reasons from the insurance markets. We interpret the estimation results 
concerning the usage of microinsurance,  i.e. the access to insurance on the supply side and as well the demand side for 
microinsurance. 
4  Demand research across many countries repeatedly identifies illness and death risks as the primary concern of most low-income 
households Further, compulsory insurance products such as credit life insurances, which are typically bounded to the uptake of a 
loan or any other financial product, are dropped from the analysis.   4
2  A Conceptual Framework of Microinsurance Participation 
The contributions on insurance participation in developing countries are rarely discussed 
in the literature except from various studies on informal insurance in developing countries 
(Townsend 1995, Morduch 1995, 1999, Dercon 2002, Churchill 2006). By looking at the 
literature on the uptake of financial services, there are considerably more studies discussing 
especially the issue of credit than of insurance participation in developing countries (Bendig et al. 
2009). Though, there are so far only few studies using quantitative data from household surveys 
to identify and analyze determinants of formal insurance participation (Asfaw 2003, Bendig et al. 
2009, Bhat and Jain 2006, Cole et al. 2009, Giné et al. 2008, Giné and Yang 2009, Ito and Kono 
2010, Jütting 2003), whereas the insurance examined are various in type such as health, life and 
rainfall insurance.  
In a simple setting Giné et al. (2008) consider a model of insurance participation with 
symmetric information, which predicts that a household’s willingness to pay for an insurance 
contract (i) increases if the household is more risk averse, (ii) increases with the expected 
insurance payout, (iii) increases with the size of the insured risks and (iv) decreases with basis 
risk
5. However, it is obvious that many households remain uninsured against significant income 
risks due to various reasons. Deviating from the above described full-information simple model, 
adverse selection and moral hazard are largely considered as potential explanations for barriers to 
insurance participation (Cawley and Phillipson 1999, Rothschild and Stiglitz 1976). Providing 
insurance has all the incentive problems related to the provision of credit (Rothschild and Stiglitz 
1976, Browne and Doerpinghaus 1993, Pauly 2004, Armendáriz and Morduch 2005). Models of 
adverse selection and moral hazard are applicable to the life and health insurance contracts 
studied here. In the case of micro life insurances, the insurance providing institution cannot fully 
observe if an individual is at high or low risk of death. Though, the national life expectancy and 
health status is public information, but to observe these individually required a high and not 
efficient effort of time, costs and human resources. Therefore, adverse selection may be a 
problem in the insurance market. It is evident that this leads to problems in the insurance 
participation practice. Moral hazard may exist as well in a setting of insurance markets, if the 
household may live with less caution and risk more after contracting insurance, which is a major 
problem especially for health, but as well life insurances. In the case of micro health insurance, 
there is evidence for the existence of adverse selection, as households having a higher ratio of 
sick members are more likely to purchase micro health insurance (Ito and Kono 2010). Adverse 
                                                 
5 I.e. increases in the correlation between the insurance payout and the risk to be insured, or more generally, the household’s 
consumption risk (Giné et al. 2008). Cole et al. 2009 use the model as a benchmark. We can not control for the prediction in 
relation to the basis risks, as our data set does not include any index based insurances.   5
selection seems one reason in combination with mistrust in the providers and unfamiliarity with 
insurance for low take-up rates, high claim rates and low renewal rates, so the providers are faced 
by difficult challenges to control for the incentive problems and simultaneously to educate the 
poor. Incentive structures such as solidarity enhancing rules seem to keep individual interests 
restrained by the group interests, whereas co-payment rules may be a strong deterrent to very 
poor households (Hamid et al. 2010). 
In addition, it is important to assess the validity of arguments emerging from existing 
theoretical work on the demand for life insurance. Lewis (1989) was the first who explicitly 
includes the preferences of the dependents and beneficiaries into the model to extend the 
theoretical framework beyond previous work. He suggests the demand for life insurance not only 
as a maximization of the consumer lifetime utility, but as well as a maximization problem of 
beneficiaries, the spouse and the offspring of the life insurance policy holder, so life insurance 
should be purchased to satisfy the needs of survivors. The household’s willingness-to-pay for life 
insurance will be (i) increasing with the probability of the breadwinner’s death, (ii) increasing with 
the degree of risk aversion, (iii) increasing with the present value of the beneficiaries’ 
consumption, (iv) decreasing with the policy loading factor and (v) decreasing with the 
household’s wealth (Lewis 1989). 
In a developed country context, there is evidence that individuals without life insurance 
are significantly less risk averse than their counterparts with life insurance, whereas the risk 
aversion increases with the income and wealth up to a mean of the respective distribution, and 
then decreases (Barsky et al. 1997). This indicates a life-cycle effect of the degree of an 
individual’s risk aversion. It is plausible to propose that better off households have a higher 
ability and willingness to bear a given amount of risk compared to relatively poor households. 
For developing countries, there is evidence that risk averse households are less likely to purchase 
insurance (Giné et al. 2008) and that households who feel themselves more exposed to risk are 
less likely to use financial services and to use life insurance (Bendig et al. 2009). In respect to this, 
it may be the fact that risky households, i.e. the households who feel themselves more exposed to 
risk, have a lower access to insurance. By development theorists the poor are assumed to be the 
most risk averse (Ray 1999). The poor are too close to subsistence, so that a given loss can be 
ruinous for the poor in developing countries (Ray 1999). In respect to this, we suggest that 
microinsurance participation of low-income households increases with the degree of risk aversion 
in Sri Lanka.  
With the level of income, life insurance participation may increase, as consumption and 
human capital increases with a higher level of income, i.e. creates a higher demand for mortality 
coverage to preserve income and consumption of household head and dependents. Lewis (1989),   6
Truett and Truett (1990), Browne and Kim (1993) and Outreville (1996) have shown that the use 
of life insurance is positively related to income using individual household data both in a 
developed and developing country context. Beyond life insurance (Giné et al. 2008) and 
especially health insurance (Jütting 2003, Pauly 2004, Bhat and Jain 2006, Dror et al. 2007), it is 
evident for developing countries that households a r e  m o r e  l i k e l y  t o  u p t a k e  i n s u r a n c e  w i t h  
increasing income or wealth of the household. Chankova et al. (2008) find no evidence that 
individuals from the poorest quintiles are more likely to be excluded from mutual health 
organizations. Evidence for Bangladesh suggests that micro health insurance placement has only 
significant beneficial effect on food sufficiency, but not to other poverty indicators (Hamid et al. 
(2010). 
Due the theoretical work of Lewis (1989), we assume that the present value of the 
beneficiaries’ consumption may increase with the number of dependents within the household, 
whereas a higher number of young dependents increase the demand for mortality coverage and a 
higher number of old dependents the demand for savings through life insurance. If the 
households value bequest motives, we assume that household’s micro life insurance participation 
increases with the number of dependents, especially young dependents, and the marital status 
“being married” due to intended bequest motives using a “joy-of-giving” motive (Hurd 1987, 
Hurd 1994, Inkmann and Michaelides 2010). Brown e  a n d  K i m  ( 1 9 9 3 )  f i n d  a s  w e l l  t h a t  a  
dependency ratio variable and life insurance is positively correlated with life insurance 
consumption. Dror et al. (2007) find that household size is the most important determinant of 
willingness to pay for micro health insurance, so the households prefer to insure not only the 
main breadwinner, but as well the entire household. 
Education may as well have an increasing effect on the time period of dependency, which 
may increase the demand for mortality coverage. A higher level of education is assumed to be 
positively correlated with the purchase of any type of life insurance product, as it may raise the 
ability to understand the benefits of risk management and savings, but as well increase 
individual’s risk aversion (Beck and Webb 2002). An often identified constraint in selling 
insurance to poor households in developing countries is a lack of understanding of insurance 
products and the differences in their cognitive ability to understand such products (McCord 
2001). Further, more educated households are more likely to take up insurance (Chankova et al. 
2008, Giné et al. 2008). Therefore, we assume that more educated household heads are more 
likely to understand such a product more easily, and be more likely to participate in such 
insurance scheme than their less educated counterparts. In the case of micro health insurance, the 
poor may as well not only understand the concept fully, but as well their medical knowledge is 
scarce, and it is difficult for them to understand what is and is not covered under the policy   7
(Chankova et al. 2008, Ito and Kono 2010). However, there is evidence that households have 
only a limited understanding of insurance and respectively risk management products and that 
factors according to financial literacy have a significant impact on the insurance participation 
decision (Cole et al. 2009). Another significant factor determining life insurance participation 
(Browne and Kim 1993, Arun and Bendig 2010b) may be religious inclination. Further, there 
exists an impact of the exposure of shocks on the usage of financial services, but it differs for the 
tested risks and financial services (Bendig et al. 2009, Arun and Bendig 2010a, Arun and Bendig 
2010b).  
3  Market Overview, Research Design and Methodology 
a)  Sources of Data, Definition of Variables and Summary Statistics 
The data for this study comes from a household survey conducted in Sri Lanka in 2008. 
The survey was undertaken as a research project on the demand for microinsurance among low-
income households in Sri Lanka and respectively South Asia
6. 
In Sri Lanka, the study site covered 30 villages in all 14 districts of all regions. Five 
different MFIs, namely Women’s Development Federation, Women’s Development Banking 
Federation, Sanasa Insurance Company, Yasiru Mutual Fund and SEEDS (Sarvodaya Economic 
Enterprises Development Services Ltd) had been identified as the main suppliers of voluntary
7 
microinsurance for low-income households in Sri Lanka. The survey sampling frame is a census 
of households randomly selected from the client bases of the five respective MFIs and allocated 
among the districts in which the MFIs are operating. From each district, two or three of the 
respective MFIs have been chosen except from Vavunia and Batticaloa, which are in the 
Northern and Eastern provinces, where only SEEDS is operating. The selected number of 
households from each district differs from 15 to 50 households. Two or three villages from each 
district and one Community Based Organization (CBO) from each village are randomly picked 
representing the selected MFIs from each district. A total of 30 CBOs are included in the survey 
with 10 to 15 clients each selected randomly from the client base. Half of these clients are insured 
and the other half is non-insured. In the case of Yasiru Mutual Fund all clients are insured, so 
that the non-insured clients were randomly chosen from the non-insured households in the 
villages, in which the insured clients of the Yasiru Mutual fund are located. In total 330 
households were interviewed, including two strata of (micro) insured and non-insured 
households, whereas 240 households use and 90 do not use any insurance, including insurances 
                                                 
6 Additional specific objectives of the individual country study and household sample selection are described in greater detail 
elsewhere See Arun and Bendig 2010a, Arun and Bendig 2010b. 
7 The participating institutions provide credit insurances as well, which are compulsory for the uptake of a loan or other financial 
product. Yet, these credit insurances are neglected in this analysis and the respective observations are dropped from the data set.   8
offered by other institutions than the five respective MFIs. 304 households of the participating 
household heads are member of a MFI and/or use at least any financial services from them, i.e. 
all 240 insured households are MFI members. Among the insured clients, 142 households 
purchased a life insurance, 29 households a health insurance and 79 households among all 
insurance buying households purchased another type of insurance, for instance vehicle 
insurance
8.  
  The data collection based on household characteristics questionnaires. The survey 
questionnaire contained detailed sections on demographic and socioeconomic household 
characteristics, household assets, the occurrence of shocks, risk management strategies, 
evaluation of household’s risk self-assessment and situation. Special focus lies on information 
about the embedding of households in financial market, i.e. the integration in different financial 
institutions, and the use of financial services. The vector of explanatory variables includes 
different household characteristics including demographic and wealth variables, education, 
economic activities of the household head, information about remittances, a risk self-assessment 
index as a continuous variable, risk exposure dummies and regional dummies
9. 
 
Table 1 provides the summary statistics. The proportion of female households is higher 
among insurance non-buyers than among insurance buyers, while only 17% of the households 
are female-headed. Insurance buyers live in larger households and among them are slightly more 
married household heads than among non-buyers. The ratio of ill household members is 
significantly higher among participants than non-participants. Insurance buyers are significantly 
older than insurance non-buyers. Among the insurance buyers, the households owns more land, 
have more remittance receivers, a lower share of no, primary or secondary educated household 
heads and a lower share of self-employed household heads than among the insurance non-
buyers. In Sri Lanka, insurance buyers belong to wealthier households compared with non-
buyers
10. The households with insurance purchase have a significantly higher risk assessment 
                                                 
8 Important to note that the use of insurance is as well not exclusive. 
9 Table 4 (in Appendix) summarizes the definition of the variables in the estimations. To test for potential problems of 
multicollinearity, we computed the pairwise correlations between the explanatory variables. For the correlation matrix of the 
explanatory variables, we see no reason for concern. We calculated variance inflation factors (VIFs) to test for possible collinearity 
among independent variables, but found no substantial collinearity. We calculated the variance inflation factors using the collin 
command in Stata. Except for the regressors “age” and “age squared” all VIFs were less than 2.38 for the survey data 
(Specification II: 2.58) for Sri Lanka. We see no reason for concern as none of the variance inflation factors was higher than 2.58. 
10 To avoid potential endogeneity problems, we constructed an asset index, which is controlled for that none of the financial 
services contracted are used to purchase any asset. Economic status quintiles were assigned at the household level using the asset 
endowment index. reflects household’s distribution among quintiles.   9
index in Sri Lanka
11. A higher share of insurance buyers experienced a severe illness of a 
household member than non-buyers. 
 
Table 1: Summary Statistics Insurance Buyers and Non-Buyers in Sri Lanka 
Full Sample  Insurance Buyers  Insurance Non-Buyers  Variable 
Mean  Std. error  Mean  Std. error  Mean  Std. error 
Female head  0.169  0.021  0.163  0.024  0.189  0.041 
Household size  4.094  0.078  4.204  0.091  3.8  0.147 
Married head  0.861  0.019  0.871  0.022  0.833  0.039 
Ratio of ill household members  0.393  0.023  0.409  0.027  0.349  0.042 
Age 47.88  0.644  47.41  0.744  49.12  1.280 
Age  squared  2428.7  64.5 2379.9 73.2 2558.8 132.9 
No or primary education  0.191  0.021  0.171  0.024  0.244  0.046 
Secondary education  0.409  0.027  0.40  0.032  0.433  0.053 
Head is selfemployed  0.594  0.027  0.579  0.032  0.633  0.051 
Head is unemployed  0.221  0.023  0.221  0.027  0.222  0.044 
Asset index  -1.9e-09  0.055  0.126  0.064  -0.337  0.102 
Quintile 1  0.2  0.022  0.167  0.024  0.289  0.048 
Quintile 2  0.2  0.022  0.179  0.025  0.256  0.046 
Quintile 3  0.2  0.022  0.2  0.026  0.2  0.042 
Quintile 4  0.2  0.022  0.221  0.027  0.144  0.037 
Land ownership  0.773  0.023  0.825  0.025  0.633  0.051 
Remittance 0.052  0.012  0.054  0.015  0.044  0.022 
Risk assessment  9.9e-09  0.168  0.009  0.067  -0.025  0.093 
Experienced death  0.073  0.014  0.071  0.017  0.078  0.028 
Experienced severe illness  0.142  0.019  0.158  0.024  0.1  0.031 
Experienced other severe risk  0.336  0.026  0.333  0.030  0.344  0.050 
Total number of households  330  240  90 
Source: Authors’ calculation. 
b)  Microinsurance Sector and Risk Exposure in Sri Lanka 
Sri Lanka has an infant microinsurance market in terms of penetration (1.48%) and 
density (16.3 US$ per inhabitant)
12, but a significant increase of microinsurance provision is 
suggested in the forthcoming years due to a high interest of private insurers in the low-income 
market, significant demand for risk management strategies of the low-income groups and strong 
efforts to provide microinsurance by potential intermediaries (Rajivan 2007, Roth et al. 2007). 
The origin of microinsurance schemes in Sri Lanka were funeral aid society concepts providing 
                                                 
11 The variable “risk assessment” is constructed from three questions related to the household’s self perception of subjective 
exposure to health shocks, road or work accidents, and economic shocks compared with neighbouring households and one 
question about household’s own rating of willingness to take risks using factor analysis. 
12 Insurance penetration is defined as the total insurance premiums expressed as a percentage of the national GDP and thus, 
measures the level of risk awareness of population and significance of insurance in the economy. Insurance density indicates how 
much each inhabitant of a country spends each year for insurance services and so is a measure of the maturity of the industry in 
the economy.   10
assistance in the case of death not only to members, but as well to their family members. In 1991 
for instance All Lanka Mutual Assurance Organization
13 (ALMAO), which is one of the apex 
microinsurance schemes in Sri Lanka, was started by seven cooperating Funeral Aid Societies 
(FASs). In our survey, we find that the five MFIs under examination serve a total of 241,800 
clients with their microinsurance products. Nevertheless, there exists several microinsurance 
products including death benefits provided for instance by the five MFIs surveyed, which can be 
interpreted as a term life insurance, or providing in addition to death, accident, hospitalization, 
health and other benefits
14. 
The risk exposure of the households and especially the risks with the expected highest 
impact on household income and consumption are important to identify possibly insurable risks 
in Sri Lanka. We ask the households surveyed to list the most important, second most important 
and third most important sources of risk that they face in the forthcoming five years. The 
households report war and terrorism (19%), which explicitly includes the fear of death or illness 
to the family due to a act of violence, as the most important peril they face in the future; a 
dramatic increase of input prices (18%) and serious illness of working adult household member 
(8%) are cited second and third most frequently. Other important family related shocks such as 
death or disablement of working adult or other household member are reported only from a 
minor proportion of the households. Nevertheless, it is evident that family related shocks are key 
risks faced by households in Sri Lanka, whereas a high share cites serious illness of a working 
adult household member as an important risk they face in the future. Yet,  in Sri Lanka a death of 
any household member are marginally reported as an important peril for the household. 
However, in terms of severity the death or severe illness of any household member, accident or 
illness leading to permanent disability are in general seen as those risks that have the highest 
financial impact on the household income and consumption. Family related shocks are generally 
characterized by their low frequency and thus, they are possible and suitable to insure under a 
microinsurance scheme. 
c)  Methodology 
We use econometric analysis to find the factors affecting insurance participation decision. 
The decision of buying insurance can be formulated in two interrelated choices. First, the choice 
of the household is related to the decision to buy or not buy any insurance. Second, if the 
household decides to buy insurance, then the second choice is to buy which type of insurance. 
                                                 
13 ALMAO is the main shareholder of Sanasa Insurance Company. 
14 For instance, Yasiru Mutual Provident Society offers products with a coverage of death, accidents and health. Women’s 
Development Federation in Hambantota provides special products in addition to death, hospitalization and health products: 
Marriage and child birth. ALMAO covers death, disability, hospitalization and life savings.   11
Further, the household has to define for how many people in the household and for what extent 
of coverage the insurance is purchased. When estimating the determinants of insurance uptake 
based on cross-sectional data, one encounters the important challenge of dealing with both the 
problems of “endogeneity” and “self selection” (Jütting 2003). Therefore, we treat any 
implication on causal relationship with caution and intend to control as far as possible for 
potential endogeneity issues. Household heads who self-select the insurance uptake may have 
unobservable characteristics – related to preference or existing enrolment in a MFI – that makes 
it more likely for them to participate in an insurance scheme, which are mainly offered by such 
MFIs, and may influence their decision to use insurance (Waters 1999). That is why the two 
interrelated choices of insurance participation decision may proceed in three sequential steps. 
To control for self-selection, we estimate two binary probit models to estimate the first 
two sequential steps of the insurance participation decision, i.e. the participation in an insurance 
scheme conditional on household’s enrolment in any MFI. In the first probit model we estimate 
the determinants of household’s enrolment in a MFI on the whole sample. In the second model, 
we investigate the determinants of household’s usage of insurance on the sub-sample of the 
households that were members of a MFI, i.e. we examine insurance participation conditional on 
MFI membership. It is assumed that MFI enrolment or insurance participation of a household (p) 
depend on the wealth status of the household (w), characteristics of the household head (H), who 
decides if the household joins or not, household characteristics (Z), regional characteristics (R) 
and on the error term u, who is uncovariant with the other regressors. The following equation is 
applied for both models using the described sample structure: 
) , , , , ( u R Z H w f p i i i i =  
In order to estimate for each equation the probability of participation we use a binary probit 
model:  
i i i i i u R Z H w p + + + + = δ φ α β
*  
1
* = i p  if  0
* > i p , meaning the household i is member of a MFI (equation 1) or uses 
insurance (equation2), 
0
* = i p  otherwise. 
For the third step of the insurance participation decision, we apply a trivariate probit 
model on the use of different types of insurance, i.e. life, health and any other insurance. Since 
preliminary analyses of our three outcomes of interest revealed that there may be a correlation 
between the different outcome categories
15 and use of any insurance is not exclusive among the 
                                                 
15 Analyses that ignore the correlations across outcomes, such as simple univariate probits, could therefore lead to biased results 
(Jones 2000). The coefficient estimates from the trivariate probit model account for unobserved correlation among the outcomes 
and are therefore less biased than those produced by three independent probit models.    12
households, so that there are households who use more than one insurance type, we assume that 
household’s choices for different types of insurance are interrelated. The trivariate probit model 
enables us to estimate three dichotomous dependent variables simultaneously and explicitly 
model the correlation in disturbance terms using a method of simulated maximum likelihood
16. 
Therefore, we use it to estimate the determinants of the three different types of insurance, which 
is given by: 
L L X L ε β + =
´ *   1
* = L  if  0
* > L , 0 otherwise, 
H H X H ε β + =
´ *   1
* = H  if  0
* > H , 0 otherwise, 
O O X O ε β + =
´ *   1
* = O  if  0
* > O , 0 otherwise, 
where L*, H* and O* are the true, unobserved propensities to use life insurance, health insurance 
or any other insurance. The term X´ represents the vector of independent variables, i.e. the socio-
demographic control variables. We assume that the distribution of the three outcomes is 
multivariate normal, i.e.:  
0 ] [ ] [ ] [ = = = O H L E E E ε ε ε    and    1 ] [ ] [ ] [ = = = O H L Var Var Var ε ε ε  
In multivariate probit models the computation of marginal effects are difficult. We therefore 
calculated the average partial effects (APEs) on the marginal probabilities of the independent 
variables for each equation by averaging sample partial effects
17.  
5  Estimating the Patterns of Microinsurance Participation 
a)  Marginal Coefficients for Microfinance Enrolment and Insurance 
Participation 
We calculate two equations to estimate the first two sequential steps of the insurance 
participation decision. Using a conditional probit model, the estimates are presented in Table 2. 
The first equation is estimated on the whole sample and has a dependent variable equal to 1 if the 
household is a member of a MFI (and respectively uses any financial service) and 0 otherwise. 
The second equation uses a dependent variable equal to 1 if the household participates in an 
insurance scheme estimated on the sub sample of the households that were members of a MFI, 
i.e. we examine insurance participation conditional on MFI membership. As our primary variable 
of interest is membership in a MFI, we hypothesize that, after controlling for individual, 
household and regional characteristics, members of a MFI have better access to and are more 
likely to use any type of insurance than non-members. Two models specifications have been 
                                                 
16 We use the Stata application mvprobit that uses the Geweke-Hajivassiliou-Keane simulator (Cappellari and Jenkins 2003, Greene 
2003, Kis-Katos 2007). 
17 We use the Stata application mvppred to calculate the predicted probabilities of a positive response for each of the three 
outcomes (Capellari and Jenkins 2003) and based on this, we calculate the APEs using the Stata routine margeff (Bartus 2005).   13
estimated for each dependent variable and estimation
18. Further, we calculated marginal effects 
for two reference households
19. 
Table 2: Institution Membership and Participation Conditional on Membership Sri Lanka 
Membership  Bought Conditional on 
Membership 
Membership  Bought Conditional on 
Membership 
Variable 
(I) (I) (II)  (II) 
Female head  0.3278***  -0.0021  0.2503***  -0.0069 
Household size  -0.0583**  0.0069***  -0.0936***  0.0055** 
Age -0.0482  -0.0036**  -0.0084  -0.0029** 
Age squared  0.0003  0.00003*  -0.00007  0.00003** 
Education of household head 
(base: tertiary education) 
     
No or primary education  -0.9615***  0.6278***  -0.9692  0.2097 
Secondary Education  0.0532  0.0118  -0.0172  0.0075 
Occupation of household head 
(base: formal employee/employer) 
     
Head is selfemployed  -0.8374***  0.0125  -0.8161***  0.0098 
Head is unemployed  -0.7462***  0.0096  -0.7659*  0.0039 
Asset Index  0.2132***  0.0171***  -  - 
Asset Quintiles (base: richest 
20%) 
     
Quintile 1  -  -  -0.9996***  -0.2621*** 
Quintile 2  -  -  -0.9999***  -0.0251*** 
Quintile 3  -  -  -0.9984***  -0.0781*** 
Quintile  4  - - -  0.0033 
Land Ownership  0.2632  -0.0017  0.3424*  0.0046** 
Remittance 0.0899*  0.5448  0.0901**  0.6719** 
Self risk assessment  0.0028  0.0031**  0.0408  0.0017 
Household’s risk experience (base: 
no risk experience) 
     
Experienced  death  - 0.1648 -  0.0361 
Experienced severe illness  -0.1737  -0.0029  -0.1308  -0.0043** 
Experienced other severe risk  0.4426***  -0.0422*  0.4806***  -0.0419* 
Regional Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 330  304  330  304 
Source: Authors’ calculation. 
Note: Probit model. Coefficients normalized to display marginal effects. The asterisks indicate level of significance (Robust z-
statistics): ***significant at 1 percent, ** significant at 5 percent, * significant at 10 percent. 
 
                                                 
18 The first one includes among the other regressors an asset endowment index as continuous variables and the second uses 
dummies for asset endowment quintiles. 
19 (1) we identify a female headed household who has 8 household members, a household head at age 45 years with no formal or 
only primary education, but self-employed, with an asset endowment index of zero, without any land, who receives remittances, 
has an risk assessment index of one, has experienced a death and illness of a household member and as well any other shock in 
past five years, (2) a male headed household who has 4 household members, secondary education, an asset endowment index of 
two, without any remittances and as well for the other variables the same outcomes as the first reference household. Important to 
note is that it may be better to create a benchmark value – an reference case – for which the marginal effects are calculated 
(Cameron and Trivedi 2009).   14
The results provide evidence that female-headed households are significantly more likely 
to be member in a MFI than male-headed households in Sri Lanka. In general, female-headed 
households can be assumed as less wealthy than their male-headed counterparts in developing 
countries, so they have significantly lower financial resources to access or participate in the 
microfinance market. For Sri Lanka we find the opposite. In Sri Lanka, women are assigned as a 
particular target group of MFIs due to higher repayment probabilities, the approach of group 
loans to socially connected women and a higher incentive to provide security to their families. 
Therefore, we find here that women-led households are more likely to participate in a 
microfinance scheme than their male-headed counterparts. Household size is significantly 
negatively linked with the membership in a MFI .  I n  t h e  d a t a  s e t  h o u s e h o l d  s i z e  i s  h i g h l y  
correlated with the number of dependents
20. The probability decreases for the first reference 
household by -0.08 and for the second one by -0.02. This implies that on the one hand, 
households with a larger number of dependents have a higher share of consumption due to their 
income, are less able to provide collateral and thus, have limited access to microfinance 
institutions. However, on the other hand, they may be more exposed to risks such as death or 
illness due to the higher number of dependents and so have a higher incentive to use their limited 
resources to obtain risk-reducing effects.  
In line with our expectations and previous findings, we find that household heads with no 
formal, primary or secondary education are less likely to be enrolled in a MFI or participate in the 
microfinance market than higher educated heads
21. A higher level of education may raise 
household’s ability to understand the benefits of risk management, in particular of microfinancial 
services and so household’s willingness to be member in a MFI. From a supply side, high 
educated household heads have generally better income earning opportunities and thus, they have 
better access to the microfinancial markets than lower educated heads. In accordance with this, 
we confirm earlier contributions that households with a head who is either self-employed or 
contractual worker are significantly less likely to obtain membership in a MFI than households 
with a head who is either regularly employed or an employer. Due to irregular and especially low 
incomes, such households have only limited access to the microfinance market. The evidence on 
the association between household economic status and MFI membership indicates that better 
off households are more likely to become a member of a respective MFI. For the asset index the 
probability for the female headed reference household increase by 0.297, while for the male 
headed reference household by 0.553. Households from the richest quintile are more likely to be 
enrolled in a MFI compared to those from the poorest quintiles (Table 2), so the poorest 
                                                 
20  The correlation coefficient for  Sri Lanka is 0.79. 
21 It may be better to use here years of schooling instead of the three educational dummies, but the survey do not include reliable 
data on that.   15
households are not covered by the MFIs under study in Sri Lanka. This may indicate that the 
poor have a lower accessibility to enter a MFI and to use respective financial services than their 
better off counterparts (Hulme and Mosley 1997, Navajas et al. 2002, Datta 2004). The exclusion 
from the market can appear voluntarily and involuntarily, whereas it is rather unlikely that the 
poor choose by themselves not to enter the microfinance market. Households who receive any 
remittances are more likely to be a member in a MFI and so are more likely to use micro financial 
services in Sri Lanka. This implies that remittances functions here as additional financial 
resources for the use of financial services. 
Conditional on MFI membership, the estimates for insurance participation are presented 
in Table 2
22. Among the households who are member in any MFI, household size is significantly 
positively associated in Sri Lanka. This implies that among MFI members in Sri Lanka, larger 
households are more likely to participate in insurances, as they may have high incentives to 
uptake insurance as an ex ante risk management strategy, for instance due to a high exposure to 
family related risks. Further, they may be not faced with a lower access to insurance markets due 
to a higher number of dependents and its influence on their socioeconomic situation. We find 
that age of the household head is significantly related to insurance participation. The turning 
point is 57
23 years of age, which implies that household heads with increasing age do not request 
more insurance. One explanation for this outcome may be that as well older household heads 
with MFI membership are less educated and thus, less able to understand insurance products and 
markets than their younger counterparts. 
In contrast to our expectations and previous findings, we find that in Sri Lanka no 
formal, primary or secondary education is positively correlated with insurance uptake, whereas 
only one estimate is statistically significant. Lower educated households have a lower 
understanding of insurance products than higher educated households do, which is a often 
identified constraint in selling insurance to the poor in developing countries (McCord 2001). 
Further, lower educated households belong typically to the weakest socioeconomic groups. 
Recent contributions in the literature show that it might be better to control for factors related to 
financial literacy in addition to common educational variables (Giné et al. 2008, Cole et al. 2009). 
We confirm our expectations that households with an higher asset endowment are more likely to 
use insurance. Households from the richest quintile are more likely to use insurance compared to 
those from the poorest quintiles (Table 2). Being an indication of household’s socioeconomic 
status, this results display that better-off households are less likely to be excluded from insurance 
                                                 
22 We have estimated binary probit models for insurance use without control for the membership in any MFI. We find changes 
due to the signs and significance levels of the estimation coefficients. 
23 The turning point is 49 years of age for the specification II.   16
markets. Remarkably, microinsurance is so far not able to reach the poorest households in Sri 
Lanka.  
Remittances are highly associated with the use of insurance. In contradiction to earlier 
findings from Bendig et al. (2009) for Ghana, we find a positive association of remittances with 
insurance uptake for Sri Lanka. Here, remittances may function more as additional financial 
resource to uptake insurance. In contrast to earlier findings in the literature (Giné et al. 2008, 
Bendig et al. 2009),  we find that households who perceived themselves more exposed to risk 
among the MFI members, are significantly more likely to use insurance in Sri Lanka
24. This 
indicates that households may not see insurance as an additional risk due to mistrust in the 
provider or misunderstanding of the offered products. By development economists, the poor are 
the most risk averse households (Ray 1999). As the insured are the better off households, this 
may indicate for Sri Lanka that the self perception of risk exposure of the insured households is 
higher due to a lower asset endowment compared to the non-insured households, or thus, the 
poorer households are not excluded from the insurance markets in spite of their higher risk 
exposure, if they are members in a MFI. For the three risk dummies, we find that households 
who experienced any other shock are significantly less likely to use insurance. 
b)  Determinants of Different Types of Insurance Participation 
For the third sequential step of household’s insurance participation decision, we employed multivariate 
probit models to investigate what determines the usage of different types of insurance, i.e. life, health and 
other insurances, offered by microfinance institutions in Sri Lanka. The results of the trivariate probit 
regressions, showing the APEs of the explanatory variables on the marginal probability to use any type of 
insurance, are presented in  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3 and in Table 5 (in Appendix)
25. Different to the previous estimations, two more 
explanatory variables – namely married head and the ratio of ill household members – are added 
here according to the relevance of bequest motives and adverse selection.  
It is important to note that the three outcome categories, i.e. the types of insurance, are 
not mutually exclusive. The estimated correlation coefficients, listed at the bottom of the tables, 
                                                 
24 However, households’ self perception of risk exposure can only function as a proxy for the risk aversion of the household. It 
may gives an indication that a higher exposure to risk of a household may represent a higher awareness of the household towards 
risks and its higher aversion towards risks. Due to the perceptive measurement of the households’ self perception of risk 
exposure, it can function only as an approximate measure of the individual’s risk aversion and thus, is linked to limited 
explanatory power. 
25 Similar to the previous estimations, we estimate two specifications, one with an asset endowment index and one with dummies 
for asset endowment quintiles.   17
indicate that the residuals of the three outcome categories are correlated
26. Two of the estimated 
correlation coefficients for Sri Lanka are negative and statistically significant, suggesting that there 
are common unobservable factors that influence an individual’s decision to purchase different 
types of insurance
27. The correlation coefficient between the unexplained part of the use of life 
and other insurance amounts to -0.69 and between health and other insurance to -0.41 suggesting 
that there are unobservable factors that influence household’s decision to purchase life or any 
other insurance and respectively health or any other insurance
28. This outcome states that from 
households perspective the participation in life or any other insurance and health or any other 
insurance are conflicting alternatives. 
Female-headship of a household is positively associated with the use of micro health 
insurance in Sri Lanka, which may deflect a higher incentive to provide security, especially health 
care, to the household compared to male-headed households. Female headed households are 
generally less wealthy and thus more exposed to risks than households with a male breadwinner. 
Women are the main health caregivers in the family due to traditional role models of women, so 
they prioritize health-related expenditures for their family than men including the premium paid 
to a micro health insurance scheme (Chankova et al. 2008). Household size is significantly 
positively associated with the participation in micro life and any other insurance. The access to 
life or any other insurance may as well not be limited for larger households due to a higher 
number of dependents. In our first specification household size, indicating the number of 
dependents in the household is a economically and statistically significant predictor of micro life 
insurance participation due to an intended bequest motive (Hurd 1987, Hurd 1994). However, 
there is no significant relationship between the micro life insurance participation and the marriage 
status of the head, which is another possible determinant according to bequest motives. If the 
household head is married, is significantly positively linked to the uptake of micro health 
insurance in our first specification and negatively related to the use of any other insurance in our 
second specification. Married household heads – similar to female-headed households – seem to 
have a higher propensity to internalize the costs and consequences related to health care than 
unmarried heads. In contrast to earlier findings in the literature, we find no evidence on the 
existence of adverse selection and ex post moral hazard, as there is no significant outcome for the 
ratio of ill household members
29. We find no life-cycle effect for any of the three insurance types, 
which indicates an u-shaped age pattern for Sri Lanka. There is significant evidence for such age 
                                                 
26 I.e. separate probit estimations for each outcome yields very similar coefficients to those of the multivariate probit model. 
27 Hence, the application of the trivariate probit regression is appropriate for the Sri Lankan case, as the correlations between the 
error terms of two equations are all zero can be rejected at a high significance level. However, we have estimated binary probit 
models for each of the insurance types separately. We find only slight changes due to the signs and significance levels of the 
estimation coefficients.  
28 In the second specification, these correlation coefficients amount to -0.71 and -0.58. 
29 We checked as well for the explanatory variable households with a sick household head and find no significant association.    18
pattern for micro life in both specifications and for micro health insurance participation in the 
second specification. Household heads have a decreasing willingness to pay up to a specific age, 
before the willingness to pay for insurance increases due to higher incentives to protect their 
families from certain hazards. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Multivariate Probit Results on the Type of Insurance for Sri Lanka (I) 
Variable  Life Insurance  Health Insurance  Other Insurance 
 Coefficient  APEs  z-statistic  Coefficient APEs  z-statistic Coefficient  APEs  z-statistic
Female head  0.016 0.0003  0.00  1.318 0.0005 1.94**  -0.063  -0.004 -0.11 
Household size  0.241 0.049  2.39**  0.234 0.00001 1.24  0.336  0.028 3.33*** 
Married head  0.056 0.009  0.09  1.322 0.00001 3.12*** -0.906 -0.104 -1.59 
Ratio of ill 
household members  0.335 0.073  0.38  -0.146 -2.99e-06 -0.15  0.077  0.005 0.23 
Age  -0.204 -0.032  -3.91***  -0.109 -2.41e-06 -0.87  -0.118  -0.006 -1.74* 
Age squared  0.002 0.0003  4.24***  0.001 2.88e-08 0.90  0.0008  0.00005 1.12 
Education of 
household head 
(base: tertiary 
education) 
            
No or primary 
education  1.939 0.568  5.02***  3.094 0.031 2.76*** 0.079  0.005 0.12 
Secondary Education  0.958 0.193  5.09***  1.829 0.0005 2.06**  0.197  0.013 0.54 
Occupation of 
household head 
(base: formal 
employee/employer) 
          
Head is selfemployed  0.768 0.127  1.69*  -0.811 -0.00005 -1.70*  -0.358 -0.024 -1.35 
Head is unemployed  0.332 0.066  0.82  -0.905 -0.00001 -2.37** -0.439 -0.022 -2.01** 
Asset Index  1.117 0.338  6.29***  1.460 0.002 3.30*** 0.503  0.049 2.71*** 
Land Ownership  0.528 0.079  1.35  -0.335 -0.00001 -0.42  0.062  0.004 0.25 
Remittance  0.629 0.154  1.35  -1.467 -8.54e-06 -1.38  1.433  0.259 1.33 
Self risk assessment  0.016 0.003  0.08  0.194 8.40e-06 1.18  -0.048 -0.003 -0.26 
Household’s risk 
experience (base: no 
risk experience) 
          
Experienced death  0.709 0.177  1.15  1.000 0.0003 3.45*** 0.564  0.055 1.52 
Experienced severe 
illness  -0.051 -0.009  -0.11  1.199 0.0004 1.35  -1.206  -0.037 -1.69*   19
Experienced other 
severe risk  -0.956 -0.143  -3.18***  0.099 2.97e-06 0.25  -1.185  -0.059 -3.45***
Regional dummies  Yes  -  -  Yes - -  Yes  - - 
Est. correlation 
coeff.  ρ21 = 0.094  1.04  ρ31 = -0.693 -9.13***  ρ32 = -0.411 -3.03*** 
Source: Authors’ calculation. 
Note: Results of the trivariate probit model are estimated by SML with 20 pseudorandom draws. t-statistics refer to the estimated 
coefficients and are based on robust standard errors. Average partial effects (APEs) are calculated with respect to the marginal 
probability of each type of insurance. The model also includes a constant. Sample size is N = 330 observations.  The asterisks 
indicate level of significance: *** significant at 1 percent, ** significant at 5 percent, * significant at 10 percent. 
 
 
In contrast with our expectations, household heads with no formal, primary or secondary 
education are significantly more likely to buy life and health insurance in Sri Lanka. However, this 
implies that lower educated household heads do not have a higher limited access to insurance or 
a lower willingness to pay for microinsurance than high educated heads. Nevertheless, they may 
have lower income earning opportunities and therefore a higher incentive to secure their families 
from the negative outcomes of certain shocks, such as death or sickness. Household heads with a 
lower educational attainment have a higher propensity to participate in any types of the 
microinsurance schemes. Due to previous contributions in the literature, it would be better to use 
additional determinants related to financial literacy to capture the relationship between limited 
financial literacy of the low-income households and their propensity to participate in different 
types of microinsurance schemes (Giné et al. 2008, Cole et al. 2009). We find similar outcomes 
for the household heads who are either self-employed or unemployed in Sri Lanka. Self-
employment and unemployment are significantly negatively associated with the use of micro 
health insurance and unemployment only to the uptake of any other insurance. Both occupation 
status are related to lower income earning possibilities and so reduce household’s  willingness and 
abilities to pay for any micro health or any other insurance. In contrast to this, we find that self-
employment is positively related to the micro life insurance participation, but is only significant in 
the first specification. Being an indication of household’s socioeconomic status, households with 
an higher asset endowment are more likely to use life, health or any other insurance in Sri Lanka. 
Households from the poorest quintile are significantly less likely to participate in a micro life and 
health insurance scheme compared to those from the richest quintile (Table 5 in Appendix). So 
far, the poorest households have still limited access to the insurance market and especially to so-
called micro life and micro health insurance policies. Interestingly, land ownership confirms this 
fact, as it is positively linked to the uptake of life and other insurance in the second specification 
(Table 5 in Appendix). 
Households, who perceived themselves more exposed to risk, are significantly more likely 
to participate in a micro health insurance scheme in the second specification (Table 5 in 
Appendix). For the three risk dummies, we find that the experience of a death of a household   20
member is significantly positively related with the participation in a micro health insurance 
scheme in the first specification and with the uptake of any other insurance in the second 
specification. The experience of a severe illness is significantly negatively related to the use of any 
other insurance. If a household experienced any severe other risk in the past five years, the 
household is significantly less likely to participate in a micro life and any other insurance. 
Households who experienced a family related shock – namely a death of a household member – 
have a higher incentive to secure for the negative outcome of such shock in the future, whereas 
after the experience of illness of a household member and any other severe shock the households 
may not see insurance as an appropriate risk management strategy, as they do not have the 
financial resources for the purchase or their access is restricted. 
6  Conclusion 
We estimate three sequential steps of household’s insurance participation decision and 
present hereby evidence on the determinants of insurance participation conditional on 
household’s MFI enrolment and factors affecting household’s decision to participate in which 
type of microinsurance. The residuals of two of the estimated correlation coefficients for Sri 
Lanka are significantly negatively correlated. There is evidence that the participation in life or any 
other insurance and health or any other insurance are conflicting alternatives for the households. 
Additionally, our results for our study site reveal several patterns.  
First, female-headship of a household is positively associated with the enrolment in a MFI 
and the use of micro health insurance in Sri Lanka. Microinsurance providers, especially in the 
case of micro health insurance, should take into consideration the higher propensity of female-
headed households to participate in such schemes. Second, household size is negatively linked 
with the membership in a MFI. In contradiction to this, we find that household size is positively 
associated with general insurance participation and the usage of micro life insurance – 
presumably due to an intended bequest motive – and any other insurance in Sri Lanka. Third, 
there exists no life-cycle effect at all, but an u-shaped age pattern may be confirmed. Fourth, we 
find that better off households are more likely to become a member of a respective MFI, while 
the poor have a lower accessibility to enter any MFI under study. Conditional on household’s 
enrolment in a MFI, the poor are more likely to be excluded from the insurance market. In detail, 
the poor are less likely to participate in a micro life and micro health insurance scheme. It is 
important to note that the microinsurance products we study have not yet succeeded in 
proportionately reaching the most vulnerable households that presumably would benefit most 
from protection against hazards such as death, illness or any other insurable peril. Extending the 
financial accessibility through MFIs and better suitability to the specific target group may   21
therefore be two strong pillars of a strategy for improving access to insurance products for the 
low-income population groups. From household perspective, it is crucial to obtain efficient risk 
management measures for asset building, wealth creation and hence social protection. As 
microinsurance is as well motivated by the lack of any social security measures, especially social 
health insurance systems, it is essential to provide affordable public social security measures to 
prevent the poor from the consequences related to family associated shocks, if the poor are 
considered to poor to participate in microinsurance schemes. 
Fifth, there is evidence that education of the household head is a strong determinant of 
household’s MFI enrolment and insurance participation in Sri Lanka. This indicates that 
information on MFI enrolment and especially on the use and type of insurances has to be 
disseminated by the MFIs in a way that caters to those who have little or no education to ensure 
that these population groups are not excluded from insurance markets. Further, the 
implementation and promotion of financial education measures by the providing MFIs may 
improve the understanding and knowledge about insurance, reduce mistrust in the providing 
institutions among possible target groups and existing clients in the communities and lead in the 
long run to financial capable individuals and households as well in the rural communities. Sixth, 
we confirm that remittances may function as an additional financial resource for household’s 
MFI membership and especially for insurance participation. 
Beyond, there is evidence that the experience of a death or illness of a household 
member, or any other shock in the past five years is related to household’s MFI enrolment and 
the use of insurance. The experience of a death is positively linked to the participation in a micro 
health insurance scheme, while the experience of illness is negatively linked to the uptake of any 
other insurance in Sri Lanka. In the beginning, we state that family related shocks are key risks 
faced by households in the future, which are mainly characterised by idiosyncratic, low loss and 
single-event types of risk. Interestingly, there is evidence in our estimates that the household’s 
experience of a family related shock is positively related to the use of any of the existing 
microinsurance programs under study. This implies that existing programs may function as 
effective ex ante risk management strategies protecting households from the potentially 
catastrophic expenditures associated with family related shocks. Though, there is still a strong 
need to extend their geographical coverage and the accessibility to the poor and adapt the 
product features more to the needs of their target groups, i.e. the most vulnerable population 
groups in the regions under study, using the experiences from the informal financial markets and 
existing products there. 
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Appendix 
Table 4: Definition of Explanatory Variables for Sri Lanka 
Variable Description 
Female head  Dummy variable, 1 if household is headed by a female, 0 otherwise 
Household size  Household size 
Married head  Dummy variable, 1 if household head is married, 0 otherwise 
Ratio of ill household 
members 
Ratio of ill household members in the previous 12 months to the total number of household 
members 
Age  Age of the household head 
Age squared  Age of the household head squared 
No or primary education  Dummy variable, 1 if household has no or only primary education, 0 otherwise 
Secondary education  Dummy variable, 1 if household has secondary education, 0 otherwise 
Head is self- employed  Dummy variable, 1 if household head is self-employed or contractual worker in either agriculture or 
non-agricultural activities, 0 otherwise 
Head is unemployed  Dummy variable, 1 if household head is not employed due to young or old age, disability, or similar 
reasons, 0 otherwise  
Assets  Assets (for Sri Lanka: motorcycle, bicycle, jewelry, refrigerator, sewing machine, electric iron, water 
heater, fan, TV, DVD, radio, fixed phone, mobile phone, main source of drinking, toilet facility, 
main source of lighting) owned by the household and was not purchased by a loan, index created by 
factor analysis 
Quintile 1-5  Five asset index quintiles labeled as Quintile 1 to 5, Quintile 1 is the poorest quintile and 
Quintile 5 is the quintile of households with the highest asset endowment. 
Dummy variables, 1 if household belong to the asset index quintile, 0 otherwise. (Quintile 
5 functions as reference category) 
Land ownership  Dummy variable, if the household owns any land, 0 otherwise 
Remittance  Dummy variable, 1 if household receives remittances from former household members who have 
migrated, 0 otherwise 
Risk assessment  Household’s assessment of risk own risk situation (subjective exposure to health shocks, road or 
work accidents, and economic shocks compared with neighbours, own rating of willingness to take 
risks), index created by factor analysis 
Experienced 
Death 
Dummy variable, 1 if household experienced the death of a household member in the last five years 
and this shock had serious consequences, i.e. household needed more than one month to recover, 0 
otherwise  
Experienced 
Illness 
Dummy variable, 1 if household experienced the illness of a household member in the last five 
years and this shock had serious consequences, i.e. household needed more than one month to 
recover, 0 otherwise  
Experienced other severe 
shock 
Dummy variable, 1 if household experienced a severe shock other than the previous described 
shock in the last five years and this shock had serious consequences, i.e. household needed more 
than one month to recover, 0 otherwise  
Locational/Regional 
dummies 
Sri Lanka: Dummy variables, 1 if household resides in the region, and 0 otherwise. Nine dummy 
variables (Western, Southern, North Western, North, Central, Sabara, North Central, Uva and 
Western region) are used in the analysis. Central region functions a reference category. 
Source: Authors’  illustration. 
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Table 5: Multivariate Probit Results on the Type of Insurance for Sri Lanka (II) 
Variable  Life Insurance  Health Insurance  Other Insurance 
 Coefficient  APEs  z-statistic Coefficient APEs z-statistic  Coefficient APEs z-statistic
Female head  -0.457 -0.071  -0.69  1.392 0.0006 2.45***  -0.510  -0.023 -0.83 
Household size  0.141 0.029  1.18  0.191 6.90e-06 1.34  0.338  0.029 2.31** 
Married Head  -0.313 -0.068  -0.59  0.864 8.55e-06 1.00  -1.354  -0.206 -2.63***
Ratio of ill household 
members  0.246 0.054  0.27  0.151 4.94e-06 0.16  -0.040  -0.002 -0.09 
Age  -0.165 -0.028  -2.89*** -0.211 -3.16e-06 -2.24**  -0.119  -0.007 -1.27 
Age squared  0.002 0.0003  3.01***  0.002 5.15e-08 2.80***  0.0008  0.00005 0.85 
Education of household 
head (base: tertiary 
education) 
          
No or primary 
education  1.588 0.462  4.11***  2.749 0.014 3.16***  -0.316  -0.016 -0.51 
Secondary Education  0.754 0.156  4.36***  1.801 0.0004 2.06**  0.056  0.003 0.24 
Occupation of 
household head (base: 
formal 
employee/employer) 
          
Head is selfemployed  0.575 0.103  1.56  -1.099 -0.00008 -2.87***  -0.332  -0.022 -1.05 
Head is unemployed  0.243 0.050  0.75  -1.945 -0.00003 -3.41***  -0.421  -0.021 -1.64* 
Asset Index  -   -  - -  -  - 
Asset Quintiles (base: 
the richest 20%)            
Quintile 1  -3.019 -0.269  -6.99*** -3.497 -0.0001 -4.39***  -0.654  -0.029 -0.95 
Quintile 2  -2.689 -0.247  -5.92*** -3.982 -0.0002 -3.62***  -0.004  -0.0003 -0.01 
Quintile 3  -2.229 -0.218  -6.48*** -1.922 -0.00003 -7.38***  -0.409  -0.020 -0.62 
Quintile 4  -0.168 -0.029  -0.89  -0.473 -6.91e-06 -2.67***  1.252  0.162 2.24** 
Land Ownership  0.771 0.133  2.13**  -0.659 -0.00004 -0.64  0.395  0.020 2.04** 
Remittance  0.362 0.083  0.50  -1.329 -6.85e-06 -1.24  2.098  0.504 1.68* 
Self risk assessment  0.014 0.003  0.08  0.333 0.00002 1.78*  0.040  0.003 0.33 
Household’s risk 
experience (base: no 
risk experience) 
          
Experienced death  0.283 0.062  0.46  -0.295 -4.17e-06 -0.55  0.817  0.097 1.96** 
Experienced severe 
illness  0.152 0.031  0.47  0.880 0.0001 1.24  -1.093  -0.036 -1.45 
Experienced other 
severe risk  -0.913 -0.147  -3.23*** -0.687 -0.00001 -1.49  -0.887  -0.046 -2.18** 
Regional Dummies  Yes  -  -  Yes - -  Yes  - - 
Est. correlation coeff.  ρ21 = 0.166  1.23  ρ31 = -0.712 -7.54***  ρ32 = -0.577 -3.91*** 
Source: Authors’ calculation. 
Note: Results of the trivariate probit model are estimated by SML with 20 pseudorandom draws. t-statistics refer to the estimated 
coefficients and are based on robust standard errors. Average partial effects (APEs) are calculated with respect to the marginal 
probability of each type of insurance. The model also includes a constant. Sample size is N = 330 observations.  The asterisks 
indicate level of significance: *** significant at 1 percent, ** significant at 5 percent, * significant at 10 percent. 